An interview with Larry Lynn

From 1987. Quick summary:

Laurence Lynn served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of Program Analysis at the National Security Council during the Nixon administration. He begins by noting the chief concerns and tasks laid out in 1969 and discusses the strategic posture review and the determination, among others, to abandon the two-and-one-half war strategy. On nuclear issues, he recalls the President’s objective not to pursue superiority but “strategic sufficiency.” There follows a lengthy discussion about ABM issues, including the change from Sentinel to Safeguard. He touches on the question of whether the administration subscribed to MAD or whether it was simply “inevitable.” Switching to arms control issues, he comments on Nixon’s attitude toward negotiations and what his objectives were (including going into the SALT process), U.S. assumptions about Soviet goals, the concerns of the verification panel, and the origins of the NCA proposal. Other topics include Kissinger’s consultations with independent scientists, whether to impose moratoria on MIRV testing, Dr. Lynn’s own change of views about the ABM, and some of the differences of opinion that existed within the administration